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Abstract— Cooperative information shared among a multi-
agent system (MAS) can be useful to agents to efficiently
fulfill their missions. Relying on wrong information, however,
can have severe consequences. While classical approaches only
consider measurement uncertainty, reliability information on
the incoming data can be useful for decision making. In
this work, a subjective logic based mechanism is proposed
that amends reliability information to the data shared among
the MAS. If multiple agents report the same event, their
information is fused. In order to maintain high reliability, the
mechanism detects and isolates misbehaving agents. Therefore,
an attacker model is specified that includes faulty as well
as malicious agents. The mechanism is applied to Intelligent
Transportation Systems (ITS) and it is shown in simulation
that the approach scales well with the size of the MAS and
that it is able to efficiently detected and isolated misbehaving
agents.
Keywords: Multi-agent systems, Fault Detection, Sen-
sor/data fusion, Control Applications
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider, for example, an intersection scenario where
an agent, in this case an intelligent vehicle (IV), can use
cooperative information, provided by an other agent, e.g. a
Road Side Unit (RSU), to smoothly merge into an occluded
traffic gap. If the information received from the RSU is
correct, the IV can use this information to increase its
efficiency. However, if it relies on faulty information, the
IV will assume a traffic gap where there is none and hence
need to do an emergency braking. In the worst case the car
will crash while merging.
The example illustrates first that the cooperative infor-
mation must be highly reliable to operate upon it, and
second that measurement uncertainty, often probabilistically
modeled in terms of means and covariances is not sufficient
to express reliability: in case of the intersection scenario,
a very precise, low variance description of an approaching
traffic gap is worthless if a faulty sensor in the RSU oversees
a further vehicle within that traffic gap.
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Subjective logic [1] is a framework that extends clas-
sical probability by an uncertainty measure reflecting all
the shortcomings mentioned above, dealing with so-called
opinions. A brief summary about the theoretical background
on subjective logic is given in Section II. The reliability
of a piece of information then results from the uncertainty
the information source itself poses on its information, the
trust in the information source, and the amount of evidence
supporting the piece of information.
In MAS, trust is usually established by reputation systems
[2]. However, as common reputation systems are always
based on previous experience, they are incapable to quickly
react to a sudden change of reliability, which might be
required due to a sensor fault or a cyber attacker taking
over an agent. Hence, common reputation systems are not
sufficient to guarantee the reliability of incoming cooperative
information. By combining a classical reputation system with
a Trust Revision Algorithm similar to that described in [3],
the mechanism proposed in this work is capable to react
quickly to a change in the reliability of a node. While [3]
proposes to do an averaging belief fusion over all available
opinions to achieve the reference opinion used to judge the
trustworthiness of the opinions, we propose to do a clustering
of all available opinions first and then calculate the reference
opinion by applying average belief fusion only to the cluster
with the most opinions. Hence, a majority of low trust
agents can challenge even a high reputation misbehaving
node. Furthermore, to account for aging of information, we
incorporate the mechanism described in [4]. The details of
the algorithm are described in Section IV.
In order to maintain a high level of reliability, a mechanism
is needed that detects and isolates misbehaving agents. In the
context of MAS control, such mechanisms are referred to as
Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) Methods [5]. However,
intentionally malicious agents have not been included so far.
Furthermore, according to the MAS survey [6] published in
October 2018, FDI methods still suffer from the following se-
vere limitations: 1) most mechanisms assume homogeneous
agents, while in an open MAS such as ITS, this assumption is
not justified, 2) exhaustive resource consumption, 3) isolating
faulty nodes is an open issue and 4) most of the proposed
solutions are centralized by nature. The mechanism described
within this work offers a proposition how these shortcomings
can be addressed.
In the field of communications, some research efforts have
been dedicated to misbehavior detection including security
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issues such as privacy of the users and intrusion detection of
cyber attacks. In his recent survey [7], published in October
2018, van der Heijden gives a broad and detailed overview on
current state-of-the-art misbehavior detection mechanisms.
The survey defines misbehaving agents as nodes sending
wrong information through the MAS, either due to a sensor
fault, or because they are malicious, i.e. cyber attackers.
However, it is stated in the survey that no ideal solution
to misbehavior detection has been published so far. A lot of
approaches also suffer badly from their exhaustive resource
consumption [8], [9]. Furthermore, the threshold when to
report a malicious message, the usage of pseudonyms, and
the traceability of users by attackers are mentioned as open
research questions. Within this work, possible answers to
these questions are provided. Furthermore, it is shown in
large scale simulation that the approach scales well and is
efficient in terms of resource usage.
In this work, we settle on the idea of Dietzel et al. [10]
to use subjective logic for misbehavior detection. However,
in contrast to building up a very general, but possibly
resource inefficient framework, the mechanism presented in
this work proposes a trade-off between security, generality,
and resource consumption. The system setup, the attacker
model, and the trade-off considerations are described in
Section III.
The key contributions of this paper can be summarized as
following:
• A trust management and misbehavior mechanism is
presented which overcomes the shortcomings described
in [2] and [6]. This is, our proposition 1) is able to
cope with heterogeneous agents, 2) shows little resource
usage, 3) can isolate faulty agents, and 4) quickly reacts
to sudden changes of reliability.
• Propositions to the open research questions 1) when to
report misbehavior, 2) how to deal with pseudonyms,
and 3) how to prevent attackers from tracing other
agents, as formulated in [7], are given.
• The proposed trust management and misbehavior detec-
tion mechanism is able to provide reliability information
on all data sent through the MAS.
II. SUBJECTIVE LOGIC BASICS
In this section, we briefly summarize the subjective logic
basics used in this paper. The definitions and theorems are
taken from [1], where further details can be found.
Definition 1 Subjective logic opinion: Let X be a domain
and card{X} ≥ 2, where card{ · } is the cardinality. Let X
further be a random variable in X. A subjective logic opinion
(opinion in short) is an ordered triple ωx = (bx, ux,ax) with
ax : X 7→ [0, 1], 1 =
∑
x∈X
ax , (1a)
bx : X 7→ [0, 1], 1 = ux +
∑
x∈X
bx . (1b)
Hereby, bx is the belief mass distribution over X, ux is the
uncertainty mass representing a lack of evidence and ax is
the base rate distribution over X representing the prior.
Definition 2 Dirichlet Distribution: Let X be a domain
of W mutually disjoint values, rx ∈ N be the evidence for
outcome x ∈ X, ax a prior distribution over X, and px the
probability distribution of x over X. Then, the probability
density function (PDF)
Dir(px, rx,ax) =
Γ
(∑
x∈X
(rx + axW )
)
∏
x∈X
Γ(rx + axW )
∏
x∈X
prx+axW−1x ,
(2)
where rx + axW ≥ 0 and px > 0 for rx + axW < 1,
is called Dirichlet PDF. A Dirichlet PDF with W = 2 is
called β-distribution. In (2), Γ( · ) is the well known Gamma
function [11].
Definition 3 Aleatory Cumulative Belief Fusion: Let
ωAx and ω
B
x be source A and B’s respective opinions over
the same variable X on domain X. Let ωABx be the opinion
such that
ωABx =

bx =
bAx u
B
x +b
B
x u
A
x
uAx+u
B
x −uAx uBx
ux =
uAx u
B
x
uAx+u
B
x −uAx uBx
ax =
aAx u
B
x +a
B
x u
A
x−(aAx+aBx )uAx uBx
uAx+u
B
x −2uAx uBx
, (3)
where 0 < uAx < 1 and 0 < u
B
x < 1, then the operator ⊕ in
ωABx = ω
A
x ⊕ ωBx (4)
is called Aleatory Cumulative Belief Fusion.
Definition 4 Aleatory Average Belief Fusion: Let ωAx
and ωBx be source A and B’s respective opinions over the
same variable X on domain X. Let ωABx be the opinion
such that
ωABx =

bx =
bAx u
B
x +b
B
x u
A
x
uAx +u
B
x
ux =
2uAx u
B
x
uAx +u
B
x
ax =
aAx + a
B
x
2
, (5)
where uAx 6= 0 and uBx 6= 0, then the operator ⊕ in
ωABx = ω
A
x ⊕ωBx (6)
is called Aleatory Average Belief Fusion. When multiple
opinions are fused, we use the shorthand
N⊕
i=1
ωAix = ω
A1
x ⊕ωA2x ⊕ . . .⊕ωANx . (7)
Theorem 1 Equivalent mapping: Let ωx = (bx, ux,ax)
be a subjective logic opinion and Dir(px, rx,ax) a Dirichlet
PDF over the same x ∈ X. Then, the equivalent mapping
bx =
rx
W+
∑
xi∈X
rx
ux =
W
W+
∑
xi∈X
rx
 ⇐⇒

rx =
Wbx
ux
1 = ux +
∑
xi∈X
bx(xi)
, (8)
transforms the Dirichlet distribution into the subjective logic
opinion and vice versa.
Theorem 2 Probability projection: Let ωx =
(bx, ux,ax) be a subjective logic opinion and
Dir(px, rx,ax) a Dirichlet PDF over the same x ∈ X.
Then, the projection
Px = bx + axux (9)
is optimal with respect to the maximum likelihood operator
on Dir(px, rx,ax).
III. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
For this work, we assume a cellular network, as cellular
network topologies are frequently used to realize connected
intelligent transportation systems (ITS) [7]. In order to
reduce bandwidth consumption, a pushed based communi-
cation scheme is used. This means that the providers of
cooperative information can publish their observations to
a topic the users can subscribe to. A broker routes the
information from providers to users. In the context of ITS,
a topic can be a map segment, e.g. of an intersection or a
highway lane. The topic association is assumed to be stored
in the digital map of the IVs. Additionally, providers/users
have to specify, for which period of time they can offer/need
cooperative information on the topic they publish/subscribed
to. Note that the broker acts as an abstraction layer between
providers and users. Hence, neither users nor providers know
which other agents they are interacting with. By using a
public key infrastructure (PKI), as specified by ETSI TS 103
097 standard [12] or IEEE 1609.2 standard [13], message
authenticity is guaranteed. In order to maintain the agents’
privacy, users and providers may have multiple, frequently
changing pseudonyme identities, with which they are con-
necting to the broker. The broker, however, holds a direct
mapping between the pseudonyms and the true, longterm
identities. Hence, by resolving the true identities of each
agent publishing or subscribing to a topic, so-called Sybil
attacks (see Section III-A) can be easily detected.
Basically, there are three groups of agents present in the
MAS: the providers sending cooperative information, the
users fusing incoming cooperative information and operating
upon them, and the broker distributing the cooperative infor-
mation through the network. In case of data inconsistency,
the receiving user reports this to the broker. The broker
then decides, in a court-case like procedure as neutral judge
according to the available evidence, which agent is misbe-
having. The trust into the misbehaving agent then is revised.
In severe cases, the broker revokes the agent’s certificate
leading to a ban of the respective agent.
In order to be able to resolve word-against-word situations,
where the same number of agents state that the other part
has shown misbehavior, the broker may keep some hidden
observers. Hidden observers are specially trusted agents that
only listen to the messages of other agents and measure their
environment without sending their information. However, if
a misbehavior is detected, the hidden observers report the
incidence. This way, harm can be avoided before an attack
is successful and attackers can never be sure whether there
is a further information source disclosing their attack.
The communication procedure can be summarized as
follows:
1) At least one provider of cooperative information pub-
lishs to a certain topic specifying a time interval during
which it can provide information.
2) At least one user subscribes to a certain topic spec-
ifying in which time interval it needs cooperative
information.
3) The broker resolves the pseudonyms and verifies that
each agent is only registered with one pseudonym.
Else, the respective misbehaving agent is classified as
misbehaving.
4) If there are providers available that offer cooperative
information for a time interval matching the needs
of users, the broker routes the respective cooperative
information from the providers to the users.
5) The users fuse the incoming cooperative information.
If the data is consistent, the users act upon them.
Else, the users report the incident to the broker. If
an incident is reported, the broker temporarily revokes
the certificates of all agents connected to the reported
incidence. Then the broker itself runs the misbehavior
detection mechanism to verify the claims and revise
the trust into the involved agents accordingly
6) After successfully completing the communication to
acquire the cooperative information, the user reports
this to the broker. The broker then increases trust of
all involved agents as described in Section IV-A.
A. Attacker Model
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the trust
management and misbehavior detection mechanisms, it has
to be stated what kinds of attacks are assumed. Until now,
no universally accepted attacker model consistently used for
cooperative ITS has been established so far [7]. Furthermore
[7] also states that the classial Dolev-Yao attacker model is
to strong. As the main focus of this work is the detection of
faults rather than sophisticated cyber attacks, the following
simple attacker model is assumed, still matching most of the
state-of-the-art assumptions [7]:
• Attackers are allowed to send semantically incorrect
data while sticking to the protocol (e.g. sensor fault)
• Attackers might use several pseudonyms in parallel
(Sybil attack).
• Attackers must be agents. Hence, although they might
have extended computational power or increased trans-
mission range, the attackers physical presence is limited.
• A local honest majority is assumed. We weaken this
assumption by introducing hidden observers. As demon-
strated in Section V-A, thus even collaborative attacks,
where two attackers coordinate their efforts, can be
detected by another agent and an RSU.
• As a cellular network topology is chosen, the broker
routing the cooperative information from providers to
users is assumed to be honest.
B. Trade-off Considerations
As stated in [7], the ideal solution for misbehavior de-
tection schemes has not been presented yet. Sophisticated
attacker models require complex defense mechanisms that
are very resource consuming. The assumption of a certain
network topology allows for resource optimization towards
that specific setting at cost of generality.
Deciding for a cellular network topology reduces gener-
ality and, due to the assumption of a honest broker, also
safety. However, from a practical perspective, a cellular based
approach is commonly used and the assumption of a honest
broker appears reasonable, because in practice the network
operators would provide the broker. As network operators
have far more sophisticated methods at hand, effectively
protecting against a malicious network provider would need
skyrocketing amounts of efforts anyway. In turn, it is easy
for the legal authorities to check the correct behavior by
frequent inspections. The network overhead is limited to
the PKI overhead. This overhead, however, is unavoidable
if message authenticity should be guaranteed [7]. A further
benefit of push-based communication is that anonymity be-
tween agents other than the broker can be easily set up. As
the broker knows the direct mapping between true identity
and pseudonyms, the broker can easily detect Sybil attacks.
Hidden agents are expensive to operate. However, a small
number of them is sufficient to increase the risk of the
agents to be detected. Furthermore with the help of hidden
observers, the assumption of a local honest majority can be
softened. Thus, a small number of hidden observers is a good
trade-off between operational cost and increased security.
IV. TRUST MANAGEMENT AND MISBEHAVIOR
DETECTION MECHANISM
The trust management and misbehavior detection mech-
anism is used to revise the trust into agents that send
conflicting information and to detect misbehavior. It basically
consists of two parts: the trust building part and the trust
revision part. Trust is build up whenever an agent has acted
correctly, while trust into an agent is revised, when its
reported opinion is inconsistent with the majority of other
agents’ opinions reporting on the same topic.
A. Trust Building
Whenever multiple communicating agents reach a con-
sensus opinion, all participating agents are rewarded with
an increase of trust into them. Furthermore, whenever the
broker decides that an agent has acted correctly during a
reported misbehavior case, the agent is strongly rewarded.
However, successfully completed cooperations between the
same agents is not statistically independent. Furthermore,
the trust into an agent should fade into uncertainty over
time, because an agent that has proven to behave well long
time ago due to sensor degradation might not be reliable in
the presence any more. This behavior is modeled using the
mapping between β-distributions and binomial opinions, Eq.
(8).
A β-distribution is parametrized by rx and sx, where sx
describes the recorded favorable outcomes of a statistical pro-
cess, while sx describes the unfavorable outcomes. Hence,
each successfully completed cooperation leads to an incre-
ment of rx by 1. If the broker finds that an agent has behaved
correctly through a trust revision case, its trust is increased by
wTR ∈ N. In order to account for the statistical dependence of
successful outcomes between the same group of agents, the
successfully completed cooperations are accumulated using
the consensus operator for partially dependent β-PDFs [14]
with dependence factor λAk . This results in the splitting
of an opinion into an independent part rAk,indx , r
Ak,ind
x and
a dependent part rAk,depx , s
Ak,dep
x according to{
r
Ak,ind
x = rAkx (1− λAk)
s
Ak,ind
x = sAkx (1− λAk)
,
{
r
Ak,dep
x = rAkx λ
Ak
s
Ak,dep
x = sAkx λ
Ak
. (10)
With the mapping (8), (10) can be mapped to binomial
opinions, where two binomial opinions ωAx and ω
B
x then are
accumulated by the operator
ωAx ⊕˜ωBx = (ωA,depx ⊕ωB,depx )⊕ ωA,indx ⊕ ωB,indx . (11)
In order to account for the fact that information on the
reliability of an agent may age over time, a probability sen-
sitive trust discounting step is introduced with the probability
Psa = P ({trust still valid}) ≈ 1. Note that the trust aging
step refers to the source trust rather than the data reliability.
The source trust can be calculated as
ω˜Akx,aged =

bAkx,aged = Psab
Ak
x
uAkx,aged = 1− Psa
∑
x∈R(X)
bAkx
aAkx,aged = a
Ak
x
. (12)
B. Trust revision
In case of inconsistency between incoming opinions, the
users will report the incidence to the broker. The trust into the
misbehaving agents then is revised. Note that the users and
the broker except for the trust revision step itself basically
run the same algorithm. Essentially, the broker just checks
whether the reported blame is justified or not and then acts
upon this. The algorithm consists of the following steps:
1) Trust discounting: The incoming opinions are dis-
counted by the source reliability and the spacial and
temporal aging of the information Td(loc,loc0)g and
Tt−t0t . More details on the aging mechanism of the
data can be found in [4]. This step can be formulated
as
Pdis = PAk,src ·Td(loc,loc0)g Tt−t0t · p0 (13a)
ω˜Akx,dis =

bAkx,dis = Pdisb
Ak
x
uAkx,dis = 1−Pdis
∑
x∈R(X)
bAkx
aAkx,dis = a
Ak
x
.
(13b)
2) Clustering: The incoming opinions are clustered with
respect to their pairwise degree of conflict
DCAj ,Akx =
1
2
∑
∀j,k>j
|PAjx,dis−PAkx,dis|(1−u
Aj
x,dis)(1−uAkx,dis) .
(14)
Therefore, the set of triples {(Aj , Ak, DCAj ,Ak)} is
sorted from small to big with respect to DCAj ,Akx
LDC =
{
(Aj , Ak, DCAj ,Akx )l=1...L
}
, (15)
and cut, when DCAj ,Akx > θDC, where θDC ∈
[0, 1] is a threshold parameter. The triplets within
LDC then form a (not necessarily connected) graph
G(SA, {DCAj ,Akx }), where the agents correspond to the
vertices, the degrees of conflict between their opinions
correspond to the edges, and each connected subgraph
SG(G) represents a competitive hypothesis about the
observation x. Hence, the subgraph SG∗(G) containing
the largest number of agents stands for the hypothesis
with the most support. Thus, all other subgraphs with
less agents are pruned. Note, however, that SG∗(G)
is not necessarily unique. In this case, all k equally
supported hypotheses are considered.
3) Calculation of the reference opinion: If all vertices of
SG∗(G) are connected with the same dominant vertex,
the respective opinion is taken as reference opinion.
Otherwise the reference opinion is calculated by
ωrefkx =
⊕
∀j∈SG∗(G)
ω
Aj
x,aged . (16)
4) Recalculation of degree of conflict: In the next
step, the degree of conflict is calculated between each
available opinion and the reference opinion
DCAj ,refkx =
1
2
∑
∀j
|PAj
x,aged−P refkx |(1−u
Aj
x,aged)(1−urefkx ) .
(17)
5) Behaviour classification: In order to classify whether
an agent’s opinion is valid or not, DCAj ,refkx is used
as measure. As long as DCAj ,refkx < θDC , the opinion
ω
Aj
x,aged is considered correct within the statistical vari-
ation and the respective agent is considered honest. In
turn, if DCAj ,refkx > θDC, the opinion significantly de-
viates from the reference opinion, which is considered
the truth. Hence, the respective agent is classified as
misbehaving. This leads to the partitioning of A into
the subsets
S refkhonest =
{
Aj ∈ A|DCAj ,refkx ≤ θDC
}
, (18a)
S refkmisb =
{
Aj ∈ A|DCAj ,refkx > θDC
}
. (18b)
In the presence of multiple references, following the
law of parsimony, the correct hypothesis is determined
by
ref∗ = arg max
k
{
card{S refkhonest}
}
. (19)
6) Trust revision: While users only report other misbe-
having agents, the broker revises the trust in agents
classified as misbehaving. The simplest way of doing
so would be to directly ban the agents classified as
misbehaving from the system. However, if misbehavior
can occur occasionally, this policy would be too harsh.
Hence, the trust revision mechanism presented in [3]
is used:
MC = max
∀Aj∈A
{
(DCAj ,ref
∗
x
}
, (20a)
AC =
1
card{A}
∑
∀Aj∈A
DCAj ,ref
∗
x , (20b)
RWAk =
MC · (DCAk,ref∗x − AC)
MC− AC , (20c)
ω˜Ak =
 b˜Ak = (1− RWAk)bAkd˜Ak = (1− RWAk)dAk
u˜Ak = (1− RWAk)uAk
, (20d)
where Ak ∈ S ref∗misb are the agents classified as misbehaving
and ω˜Ak is the respective reviced trust into agent Ak. In (20),
MC stands for mean conflict, AC for average conflict, and
RW for revision weight, respectively.
V. SIMULATIONS
In this section, the proposed trust management and misbe-
havior detection mechanism is evaluated through simulation.
First the applicability of the mechanism to the exemplary
intersection from the introduction is demonstrated in simu-
lation, then a large scale simulation is given showing that
the mechanism scales well with the size of the MAS. For
the intersection example, [15] describes the consecutive work
with a focus on safty based on a real world example.
A. Merging into an intersection with occlusion using coop-
erative information
In order to demonstrate the effects of the misbehavior
detection mechanism in detail, the mechanism is applied to
the intersection scenario from the introduction and evaluated
by simulation. Consider the intersection scenario as depicted
in Figure 1, where the vehicle C is approaching an inter-
section with occlusions, aiming to merge. Vehicle A follows
vehicle B on the main road having the right of way. An RSU
observes the whole intersection. All four agents measure the
position x of vehicle B. For simplicity, in this paper, only
the 1D position of vehicle B on its lane is considered and
the motion is assumed to be compensated already by a feed-
forward control. Hence, x = 0 means that vehicle B is at
its predicted position. For the measurement of B’s position,
Gaussian noise with a mean of µ = 0.25 m and a standard
deviation of σ = 0.75 m is assumed.
The agents build their opinions on x using the following
algorithm:
1) Each agent transforms the measurements X according
to Z = X−µˆσˆ . Hence for the estimates µˆ = µ and
σˆ = σ, Z ∼ N (z|0, 1).
2) Each agent estimates the distribution of Z using a
histogram. The histogram is mapped to the agent’s
opinion ωAx according to (8) and ω
A
x is published.
Ayield
Fig. 1. Intersection scenario.
If inconsistency is reported, the broker performs the misbe-
havior detection mechanism presented in Section IV-B. The
RSU and the vehicles A and B create their opinion based on
N = 50 measurements, which corresponds to vehicle B been
sensed for 5 s at a typical sampling rate of 10 Hz. Due to
the occlusion, vehicle C only gets NC = 10 measurements,
corresponding to vehicle C sensing vehicle B only for 1 s.
The following scenarios are evaluated:
1) All agents behave correctly.
2) The RSU is faulty. Hence σˆRSU 6= σ, µˆRSU 6= µ. The
RSU detects its fault by applying the misbehavior de-
tection mechanism and recalibrates itself, i.e. estimates
µˆRSU and σˆRSU again.
3) The vehicles A and B launch a cooperative attack to
discredit the RSU. Both of them use µˆ = 1.0 m, σˆ =
0.75 m, unaware that vehicle C is approaching as
well. A word-against-word situation builds up that is
resolved by comparing the opinions about vehicle C’s
position xc.
The results of scenario 1 and 3 are summarized within
Figure 2. It can be seen from Figure 2 that θDC ∈ [0.15, 0.2]
is a reasonable choice. For θDC < 0.15, the misclassification
rate is too high as statistically insignificant deviations from
the reference opinion are considered a thread, while for
θDC > 0.2 the misbehavior detection mechanism gets insensi-
tive. For θDC ∈ [0.15, 0.2], the detection probability even of a
collaborative attack is at about 70%, the probability of at least
identifying one of the agents as misbehaving is at 80%, while
the probability that the collaborative attack is successful is
between 5.7% and 11.7%. Thus, the misbehavior detection
mechanism is capable to cope with such collaborative attacks
even for this worst case scenario.
Figure 3 shows the Receiver Operation Characteristics
(ROC) curve for different estimations of µˆ and σˆ. The closer
an ROC curve gets to (0, 1), the better. It shows that even
estimation errors smaller than the standard deviation can be
efficiently detected at low false positive rate.
When the RSU is classified as misbehaving, it recalibrates
itself based upon its wrong opinion and the reference opin-
ion, according to
µˆ = z>PRSU − z>Pref , (21a)
σˆ =
√∑
∀i
( (zi − µˆ)PRSU,i )2 , (21b)
where z are the centers of the histogram bins. The recalibra-
tion has been evaluated over 1000 runs for θDC = 0.15. In
average, µˆ = 0.250 m and σˆ = 0.765 m resulted. Thus the
mechanism not only detects the fault but corrects it as well.
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Fig. 2. Classification rate as function of threshold in the collaborative
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Fig. 3. ROC curve for the misbehaving RSU scenario (scenario 2).
B. Traffic jam detection
In order to demonstrate that the presented approach scales
well with the size of the MAS and to gain high statistical
certainty, the presented algorithm is evaluated on a large
scale scenario simulating the whole traffic of Cologne. As
simulation environment, Simonstrator [16] and SUMO [17]
are used. In the scenario, 10% of the agents are assumed to be
misbehaving. Figure 4 shows the detection probability ptp as
well as the false positive rate pfp within each measurement in
dependence on the agents’ error rate and the threshold θDC.
The results describe the agents’ reporting behavior, hence
the presented algorithm is run without the trust revision step.
For example, it can be seen from Figure 4 that if 10% of the
data reported by a correctly behaving agent is wrong and
θDC = 0.1, the detection probability is about ptp ≈ 45%,
while pfp ≈ 10%. For a rough illustrative calculation, it
is assumed that the trust into an agent is depleted if three
misbehaviors are detected within a batch of three consecutive
reports, while the trust is restored for each batch. Then, the
probabilities of wrongly blaming a correctly behaving agent
pwb and the probability of detecting a misbehaving agent pdm
are given by
pwb = 1− (1− p3fp)n and pdm = 1− (1− p3tp)n , (22)
respectively, where n is the number of batches. Hence, after
n = 15, i.e. after a total of 45 reports, pwb = 76.1% of the
misbehaving agents are eliminated from the system, while
only 1.49% of honest agents are excluded. At typical mea-
surement update rates of 10 Hz, even if several measurements
are bundled to a single reported opinion and even if there are
time gaps between the reports, it is a matter of minutes till
the vast majority of misbehaving agents is excluded from
the system. This illustrates that the misbehavior detection
mechanism works well.
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Fig. 4. Detection probability and False positive rate in dependence of the
threshold θDC and the error rate of the agents resulting from the large scale
traffic simulation of Cologne.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, an trust management and misbehavior detec-
tion mechanism has been presented that, based on subjec-
tive logic, amends reliability information to the cooperative
information spread through the system. The mechanism is
resource efficient and robust against faulty and even in-
tentionally malicious agents. It has been shown that the
mechanism is abled to quickly detect and remove such
misbehaving agents from the system and thus a high overall
reliability can be provided.
In future work, the presented mechanism might be trans-
fered to other network topologies.
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